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Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is a major enabler of ubiquitous computing environments which brings enormous productivity benefits in applications such as ticketing, supplychain management, contactless payment systems, etc. RFID systems operate via a wireless radio frequency in an insecure channel, which has numerous security and privacy risks. Since this medium can be easily accessed by everyone, the communicated messages between the reader and the tag can be observed, tracked, eavesdropped or forged and later the fake messages can be replayed. Moreover an adversary can arbitrarily modify the conversations between any pair of tag and reader and indeed initiates and terminates a session at its choice. To deal with the security and privacy threats, many privacy-preserving authentication protocols [1~4] for RFID tags have been proposed so far. RFID tags are generally low cost with extremely limited resources, so they cannot perform standard cryptographic operations, such as symmetric encryption and the public key algorithms. So authentication protocols should ensure that the underlying computations are not resource intensive. The challenge in the design of such security protocols is to strike the right balance between security and cost.
In a RFID tag-wide universe, a mechanism that can prove a group of objects with their corresponding RFID tags appeared at the same time and the same place can be very useful in different applications. In 2004 Ari Juels first introduced yoking-proof [5] , which involves generating evidence of simultaneous presence of two tags in the range of an RFID reader. The proof can be verified by a verifier which holds all the secret keys of tags. Juels [5] extended this notion and envisioned the concept of grouping-proofs [6~8] (also denoted by yoking proofs), which allows multiple RFID tags to provide evidence that they are scanned simultaneously in an identification session by one or more RFID readers within its broadcast range. Other improved variants of yoking-proof were also proposed in [7, 10, 11] . As Juels [5] already pointed out, there are several practical scenarios where groupingproofs could significantly expand the capabilities of RFID-based systems, such as manufacturing, supply chains, access control, business automation applications, retail operations, vehicle tracking, eticketing, pharmaceutics and counterfeit prevention, etc. Motivated by the potential applications, several grouping-proof mechanisms for RFID tags are developed in recent years [6~13] . Based on security analysis of the previous works [5~13], we have found that these proposed grouping-proof schemes recently have security weaknesses and they cannot defend against malicious attacks.
In 2009, Dang and Kwangjo proposed a scalable grouping-proof protocol [14] for RFID tags, which attempts to avoid relaying messages among multiple RFID tags based on Shamir's (n, n) secret sharing. Their proposal aims to improve scalability and, at the same time, to offer a significant reduction in the computational load of the tag. In [14] , the authors give a theoretical analysis of the protocol from the point of view of security and performance. They claimed that their protocol is secure against impersonation attack and spoofing attack. But based on the detailed security analysis, the security that they claimed unfortunately cannot hold.
The key contribution of this paper is a critique of previous RFID grouping-proofs and points out the vulnerabilities of D-K protocol [14] . We found that D-K protocol does not achieve its design objective and has the serious security and/or privacy omission, which cannot provide data confidentiality and fails to defense against malicious attacks, such as Man-in-the-middle (MITM) Attack and Counterfeit Attack, and meanwhile breaks the privacy properties of Data Confidentiality, Tag Anonymity and Untraceability. We then show the flaws in the design of D-K protocol which need to be avoided in designing new grouping-proof protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the security and privacy concerns in RFID systems. In Section 3 we present a critical review of the related work. Then we brief review D-K protocol in Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze its vulnerabilities. And then the design flaws of D-K Protocol are analyzed in Section 6. At last, we conclude the paper and present future work in Section 7.
RFID Security and Privacy Risks
Security problems in RFID systems can be put into two categories [15] . The first concerns malicious attacks which aim to wipe out the functioning of the system, such as: passive eavesdropping attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, counterfeit attack and denial of service (DOS) attack. The second category is related to privacy: the problem is information leakage, as a tag may reveal data about an object which contains it (for example the title or author of the book) and also launch traceability attack. Information leakage can be avoided if the tag only transmits one identifier which can only be used by those persons having access to the system's database. However, this does not prevent traceability. The traceability of tags, and by extension of people, is a difficulty that RFID technology must surmount if it is to be widely used.
The goal of the adversary is to undermine the functionality of the RFID deployment. The adversary controls the delivery schedule of the communication channels, and may eavesdrop into, or modify their contents, and also instantiate new channels and directly interact with honest parties. Obviously, the hard part for the design of a secure grouping-proof protocol is to defend against various malicious attacks which can deteriorate the credit ability of a proof or make a proof invalid when a successful attack is occurred. A qualified RFID grouping-proof protocol should comply with several essential security and privacy requirements, such as data confidentiality, tag anonymity, forward security, untraceability and defending against malicious attacks.
In RFID systems, readers are assumed to have a secure connection to a back-end database. Although readers may only read tags from within the short (e.g. 3 meter) tag operating range, the reader-to-tag, or forward channel is assumed to be broadcast with a signal strong enough to monitor from long-range, perhaps 100 meters. The tag-to-reader, or backward channel is relatively much weaker, and may only be monitored by eavesdroppers within the tag's shorter operating range. Recently the research works [16] assume the most reasonable (strongest) threat model that an active man-in-the-middle can eavesdrop, intercept or modify messages in real time on both forward and backward channels without detection. And the protocols in [17] assume the man-in-the-middle attack, which rationalizes our work. Beyond hardware-based techniques [2] , many researchers have looked into the security and privacy problems in RFID systems in order to design protocols which allow authorized persons to identify the tags without an adversary being able to trace them.
RFID Grouping-proof Protocols and Their Weaknesses
In this section we briefly review existing grouping-proof protocols proposed in the literature and discuss their weaknesses.
The idea of grouping proofs originates from Juels [5] in 2004. The motivation comes from any application that requires the combined presence of two (or more entities), which focuses on how to successfully prove two (or multiple) distinct RFID tags shown at the same place and the same time by utilizing one or more RFID readers within the broadcast range of RFID readers. Nevertheless, Saito & Sakurai [6] were the first to point out weaknesses in the work of Juels. They indicated that the yokingproofs protocol is not immune to replay attacks and proposed an enhanced version of the yoking-proofs protocol. But Burmester [10] et al. pointed out two additional weaknesses in Saito & Sakurai [6] : Denial-of-Service (DOS) and impersonation attacks were feasible. In addition, Piramuthu [7] showed Saito's protocol [6] with timestamps is also vulnerable to replay attack. According, he proposed another variant of yoking-proof which does not use timestamp to prevent replay attack. Although Piramuthu [7] provides higher security level, his scheme does not resolve security threats such as privacy disclosure of tagged-item owner, forward secrecy divulgence, authentication sequence disorder and DOS attack. In particular, the random numbers used are vulnerable to a multi-proof session attacks.
The idea of anonymous grouping-proofs was first introduced by Bolotnyy and Robins [8] in 2006, which accommodates a group of RFID tags by generalizing the concept of yoking proofs and addressed the requirements on privacy. In 2007 Peris-Lopez et al. [9] discovered Piramuthu [7] used random numbers in such a way that it is cannot resist tag-tracking attack and multi-proof session replay attacks, which is a variant of counterfeit proof attack. To solve these security threats, Peris-Lopez et al. developed a novel coexistence proofs protocol, so-called clumping-proofs [9] . However, their value is updated regardless of the received flows, so they can be incremented arbitrarily by the adversary. Therefore this protocol is not reliable when defending against DOS attack, forward secrecy disclosure and authentication sequence disorder. Two protocols, individually proposed by Lien et al. [12] and Lin et al. [11] , had resolved several security pitfalls in Piramuthu [7] such as reading order dependence and authentication sequence disorder. Lin et al. [11] pointed out that Piramuthu [7] suffers from interference problem when multiple readers are represented and the timestamp-based yoking-proof [3] is indeed not secure against replay attack. Chien et al. [13] also proposed an offline grouping-proof protocol. Unfortunately it is vulnerable to replay attacks.
Based on the above analysis we can conclude that previous protocol published is vulnerable to attacks of major or minor relevance.
Review of D-K Grouping-proof Protocol
In this paper, we denote the verifier as V, the reader as R, the tag as T i , and the adversary as A. As for memory requirements, each tag stores a static identifier ID and a key K i which is shared between the tag and the backend database registered in the system. Then we give a brief introduction to D-K Grouping-proof Protocol. For more details, please refer to [14] .
(1) V→R: V chooses x at random and sends to R. (2) R→T i : Given a secret x, R chooses (n-1) random numbers y 1 , y 2 …, y n-1 as the first (n-1) shared secrets based on (n, n)-SS. The last shared secret y n is computed by y n = x⊕y 1 ⊕y 2 ⊕…⊕y n-
V verifies a proof P by checking if P is received within the lifespan of x = y 1 ⊕y 2 ⊕…⊕y n and each m i is valid MAC of the tag T i on (x, y i ) for i=1, 2, …, n. The authors of D-K protocol presented some security analysis and claimed that D-K protocol is secure against an adversary attack and the success probabilities of the adversary is attacking the underlying MAC and secret sharing schemes. In this paper we are concerned with attacks that target low-cost RFID tags, in particular attacks that: man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, counterfeit attack, traceability attack, anonymity attack and data confidentiality attack. In the next section, we identify effective attacks that break D-K protocol.
Vulnerabilities of D-K Grouping-proof Protocol
In this section, we illustrate in detail the mechanics to attack D-K protocol passively or actively. The passive adversaries can only eavesdrop the communication messages between a reader and a tag and the active adversaries can modify and inject messages between a reader and a tag. We present concrete attacks to D-K protocol. As is commonly assumed, we assume that the communications between the server and the reader are secure, which can be guaranteed by using full-fledged cryptographic technologies. Our security analysis shows that D-K protocol cannot meet the security and privacy properties that they claimed. It fails to defense against malicious attacks and adversary's trace, and breaks the privacy properties of tag anonymity and data confidentiality, so it has the serious security and/or privacy omission. In the following, we will present the vulnerabilities of D-K protocol.
Man-in-the-middle Attack (MITM)
In D-K protocol, the transmitted message among R-T unsecure channel is the couple main-subsecret (x, y i ) in plaintext in every authentication session, which makes this protocol not resist malicious attacks. We focus on MITM attack where an active adversary can intercept and modify messages exchanged in the protocol. The adversary eavesdrops a valid authentication session between the target tag and the reader and modifies both reader-to-tag and tag-to-reader messages to make them believe that they are talking to the intended party, respectively. The active MITM attack is plotted as below: (1 
Counterfeit Attack
Authentication is the process whereby one party is assured of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated. Impersonation is an attack on authentication. An adversary can impersonate the reader using the messages collected from the tag. On the other hand, an adversary can reply to the reader's query by impersonating a tag. Any secure RFID authentication protocols must resistance against all kind of forgery attacks. In the following, we show that an active adversary can successfully impersonate a legitimate reader to a tag in D-K protocol even when the adversary has no access to any of the tag's secrets. The details of counterfeit attack are given below: (1) Reader Impersonation Attack D-K protocol claimed that an adversary cannot respond to tag queries due to their ignorance of the private information and the use of fresh main-secret x in each valid authentication session. However, we show an active adversary, without the knowledge of the corresponding secrets of a tag, can successfully impersonate a reader to a tag. In the following, we prove that it is vulnerable to reader impersonation attack.
Before producing and sending shared-secret y i to T i by R during phase 2, the adversary can capture a legitimate R and then acquire main-secret x itself of this authentication session. On capturing mainsecret x transmitted in a valid authentication session between R and T i , A impersonates reader R' by faked shared-secrets y' i to communicate with T i (The construction of y' i is similar to MITM attack in step 2). Then R' can supplant a genuine reader by sending the new message (x, y' i ) to T i and then T i sends (
computed by T i . R' forms the grouping-proof P'= (T 1 , y' 1 , m' 1 , T 2 , y' 2 , m' 2 ,…, T n , y' n , m' n ) and forwards it to V. On account of the equation x = y' 1 y' 2 … y' n-1 y' n , V verifies MAC is valid and meanwhile P' is a valid grouping-proof. The tag T i cannot, therefore, detect the ploy and authenticates R' as a genuine reader R. In this attack model, the adversary monitor V-R-T channel by impersonating R' and achieve a valid grouping-proof without detection. So we claim that D-K cannot resist R impersonation attack.
(2) Tag Impersonation Attack
Tag impersonation attack is a forgery attack in which the reader authenticates a spoofed tag as a legitimate tag. This attack can be used to fool a reader that a tag is present while it is not. In this attack, the adversary has no knowledge about the internal state of the tag and impersonates the valid tag by using the data acquired from the valid tag. The reader cannot verify that whether it is communicating with the valid or the fake tag. Based on the detailed analysis, we can find that D-K protocol is secure against tag impersonation attack, since it is difficult for an adversary to compute a valid response (T i , m i ) to a reader's query and authenticate itself to a legitimate reader without knowing the key K i of T i . That is, only genuine tags can compute correct answers to the readers' queries because private information shared between the tags and the verifier is employed in message generation. The detailed analysis is described as follows: is equivalent to the difficulty of attacking MAC [3] . Supposing that the adversary impersonates a tag T i ' with the forged key i K ' , the response of
to the challenge(x, y i ) from R and then R collects n responses
to form P'= (T 1 , y 1 , m' 1 , T 2 , y 2 , m' 2 , … , T n , y n , m' n ) and sends it to V.
, V utilizes the genuine secret key K i to gets the result
x yi i K is invalid MAC. Even though the adversary tries to modify the received challenge(x,
, this difficulty is also equivalent to attacking MAC [3] . Therefore, T i Impersonation Resistance will not succeed.
As the above analysis, we can conclude that D-K protocol cannot resist reader impersonation attack.
Traceability Attack
Traceability is one of the most important security threats in RFID environments. For the reason of the notably privacy implications due to tags' mobility, the traceability problem has recently attracted a lot of interesting research. In [18] , Juels and Weis gave a formal definition of traceability, which was later reformulated, in a style more similar to that used for security protocols, in [19] . D-K claimed that the proposed protocol guarantees untraceability due to the use of new random numbers x in each session and also it is secure against backward traceability even when the tag is compromised. However, we find that D-K protocol break untraceability which cannot guarantee location privacy for the tag owners. In the following we show how an adversary is able to trace tags and puts at stake the location privacy of the tags' holders. Specifically, the passive adversary is given a target tag T i which is supposed to trace and he can succeed in the traceability attack only by eavesdropping the message transmitted in R-T channel. The details of traceability attack are given below: D-K protocol put it at risk by designing schemes where tags answer readers' queries with static values, thus making traceability attacks not only possible but trivial. Since the responses (T i , m i ) of every authentication session from tag to reader include the unchanged value T i in different authentication sessions and also isn't anonymous, the adversary can eavesdrop the responses (T i , m i ) of different sessions by listening in on the backward channels easily and then traces the tag T i . Supposing that the adversary eavesdrops the responses 
in two consecutive
Cryptanalysis of a Scalable Grouping-proof Protocol for RFID Tags Yali LIU, Xiaolin QIN, Bohan LI, Liang LIU sessions and traces the same tag T i . Similarly, in the following sessions (j+2, j+3, …… j+n), after eavesdropping more consecutive rounds of the protocol, the adversary eavesdrops the multiple responses(T i , m i )and abstracts the static values T i of the same tag. Therefore, the adversary can trace transactions and acquires location of any tag T i in grouping-proof by using the same ploy. Thus the tags can be tracked by unauthorized parties and the location privacy of any tag T i is violated.
Our analysis shows that an adversary, by simply listening in on the channel and blocking the message (T i , m i ) sent from a tag to a reader, is able to discriminate this tag between a population of n tags (this privacy concept is compatible with the Juels-Weis untraceability model [18] ). As the above analysis, we claim that D-K cannot resist the passive traceability attack.
Anonymity Attack
Anonymity [20] means that given two interactions the adversary cannot say whether they are with the same tag T i , which is also called unlinkability, or indistinguishability. D-K argued that their protocol guarantees tag anonymity, but we find that it cannot hold. The detailed analysis is as follows:
In every authentication session, the responses (T i , m i ) are transmitted from tag to reader in plaintext. As T i is static value and the value T i isn't be randomized per successful authentication, the adversary can eavesdrop the static value T i easily from T-R channel and then the location privacy of the tag is somehow endangered since an adversary can track the tag using the static value T i . Moreover the adversary can know which tag in the set of grouping-proof replies to the reader's challenge in one authentication session by using the static value T i . Its acquisition means that information privacy, which should be one of the principal security objectives of the system, is not guaranteed. So tag anonymity cannot be guaranteed and D-K protocol cannot meet the security requirement for user privacy in practical scenario. We emphasize that this attacks are very efficient, since passive capture of messages in just one authentication session is all that is required for their success.
Data Confidentiality Attack
Data confidentiality is one of the essential security and privacy requirements for RFID systems. From the above analysis, we can conclude that D-K protocol cannot guarantee data confidentiality. On account of the challenge-response transmitted in plaintext, the adversary can acquire the private information linked to a specific tag T i from the R-T channel and then breaks untraceability. So the static value T i about tag's private information is not well protected from the eavesdroppers. Passive attacks are feasible in practice since they only require eavesdropping, which is a typical threat in RFID setting where the physical wireless communication channel is open to parties within transmission range. With the ubiquity of RFID tags, whose existence is often oblivious to the human user or whose embedded presence around the human is often beyond his/her control, data confidentiality and location privacy of the user therefore comes under threat when s/he goes about daily activities, coming into contact with other parties that share the common physical wireless pace, and that could potentially launch passive attacks without being noticed.
Design Flaws of D-K Grouping-proof Protocol
Above we presented serious attacks against D-K protocol, so the design of this protocol is not secure in spite of some novelty. In this section, we show the design flaws with their claims. The key reasons of the weaknesses behind D-K Protocol are as follows: (1) Construction Location of Shared-secret Unsafe
In the phase 2 of D-K protocol, shared-secret y 1 , y 2, …, y n-1 is constructed by R randomly and y n is computed by y n = x y 1 y 2 … y n-1 . If the adversary captures a legitimate R, he can acquire the couple main-sub-secret (x, y i ) of this authentication session. And then the adversary supplants a genuine reader to send the faked challenge(x, y' i ) to a legitimate tag T i by faked shared secrets y' i (The construction of y' i is described in MITM attack in step 2). After the adversary receives the response from T i , he forwards it to V. Based on the analysis in section 5.2 counterfeit attack, V verifies this challengeresponse valid, and that is, R's being captured cannot be detected.
(2) Construction Method of Shared-secret Unsafe
In the phase 2 of D-K protocol, shared-secret y 1 , y 2, …, y n-1 is constructed by x = y 1 y 2 … y n-1 y n . If the adversary eavesdrops the couple main-sub-secret(x, y i ) of this authentication session from R-T channel, he can construct the forged shared-secret y' 1 , y' 2 …, y' n by the method of x = y' 1 y' 2 … y' n-1 y' n and then send the forged challenge (x, y' i ) to a legitimate tag T i . The adversary collects the response from T i to form the grouping-proof P' and forward it to V. Based on the above analysis, V verifies P' valid and the adversary achieve the objective of monitoring R-T communication without detection.
(3) Challenge Method from R to T Unsafe
In the phase 2 of D-K protocol, the challenge transmitted among R-T unsecure channel is the couple main-sub-secret (x, y i ) in plaintext of every authentication session. If the adversary eavesdrops (x, y i ) and abstracts main secret x, then he sends the forged sub-secret (x,y' i ) to a legitimate tag T i . On account of x unchanged, V can reconstruct x by the responses of legitimate tags T i and the adversary can monitor R-T communication without detection. The detailed analysis is similar to (2) in this session.
(4) Response Method from T to R Unsafe
In the phase 3 of D-K protocol, the response transmitted among T-R unsecure channel is (T i , m i ) in plaintext of every authentication session. Since the response (T i , m i ) from T to R includes the unchanged value T i in different authentication sessions, the adversary can eavesdrop the static value T i by listening in on the backward channels easily and then traces the tag T i . The adversary achieves the objective of tracking and obtaining the location of the same tag T i by eavesdropping the same value T i in two or more responses. Moreover the static value T i is transmitted in plaintext, therefore tag anonymity cannot be guaranteed and it violates the user privacy requirement.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that vulnerabilities of D-K protocol stem from the use of the static value T i in plaintext as one part of legitimate tags' response. An adversary can use the above weak points to launch malicious attacks. The user's privacy mainly includes the leakage of location information or tag information of the tag's owner. In the future, these flaws need to be avoided in designing new grouping-proof protocol. If the messages exchanged between tag and reader are different or random each time during all the authentication sessions, it is impossible to track the tag's location through the previous changed messages.
Conclusions
As an important part of RFID authentication protocols, the grouping-proof protocols need to focus on security, privacy and scalability. In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of a scalable grouping-proof protocol for RFID tags which are recently proposed by Dang and Kwangjo. D-K claimed that their protocol is resistant to the malicious attacks and assert that it have the desired security and privacy properties for RFID communications. Based on the security analysis, we discovered that D-K protocol is vulnerable to active attack and passive attack and fails to guarantee the privacy properties of tag anonymity and untraceability and meanwhile cannot provide the essential security requirement of data confidentiality. The severity of the weaknesses indicates the insecure design of the protocol. Moreover we summarize the design flaws of D-K protocol which need to be avoided in designing new grouping-proof protocol. For future work, it would be interesting to develop efficient ultralightweight mutual grouping-proof protocol for low-cost RFID tags, which will get wider application in aggressively deployed RFID systems.
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